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THE ORGANIC CONSTITUTION:
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE
EVOLUTION OF CANADA0
By BRIAN SLATERY*
Despite recent advances in the law of aboriginal rights,
most Canadian lawyers still tacitly view the
Constitution as the outgrowth of European legal
traditions, transplanted into North America. This
article identifies the main features of this model of the
Constitution and proposes a more appropriate model
to replace it, one that recognizes the Constitution's
deep roots in Canadian history and traditions, and
acknowledges the distinctive contributions of
Aboriginal peoples and their long-standing relations
with the Crown.
Malgr6 les avances r6centes dans la loi des droits
autochtones, la plupart des avocats canadiens
continuent tacitement A consid6rer la Constitution
comme le produit des traditions 6gales europmennes,
transplant6es en Am6rique du Nord. Ct article
identifie les caractdristiques principales de ce modle
de la Constitution, et il propose un modhie plus
appropri6 &L le remplacer, qui reconnait les racines
profondes de la Constitution dans l'histoire et les
traditions canadiennes, ainsi que les contributions
distincitives des peuples autochtones et de leurs
relations de longue date avec la Couronne.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What we don't like about the Government is their saying this: "We will give you this
much land." How can they give it when it is our own? We cannot understand it. They
have never bought it from us or our forefathers. They have never fought and conquered
our people and taken the land in that way, and yet they say now that they will give us so
much land-our own land.... [O]ur forefathers for generations and generations past had
© 1996, B. Slattery.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The author would like to
thank Vladislav Tumir for his helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at
the Conference "Lessons from Oka: Forging a Better Relationship," held at the Faculty of Law,
McGill University on 13 February 1991, and was later published in the Conference proceedings: see
B. Slattery, "The Path to Crisis: Origins of Conflict" in A.P. Morrison, ed., Justice for Natives:
Searching for Common Ground (Montreal: Aboriginal Law Association of McGill University, 1994)
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their land here all around us; chiefs have had their own hunting grounds, their salmon
streams, and places where they got their berries; it has always been so.1
This statement could have been made yesterday, or a decade
ago, or a century ago. In fact, it was made in 1888, by David Mackay of
the Nishga Nation of British Columbia, while addressing a Royal
Commission visiting the Nishga Territory.
In the same year that Mackay met the Royal Commission, the
Judicial Committee of the Imperial Privy Council in London was
considering arguments on the nature of indigenous land rights in
Canada. At that time, the Privy Council was the final court of appeal for
Canada, as well as for other British colonies. The case, St. Catherine's
Milling & Lumber Co. v. R.,2 did not directly involve native peoples. It
was a dispute between Canada and Ontario over which government
reaped the benefits of an Indian treaty ceding lands to the Crown. Lord
Watson delivered the Privy Council's decision. He referred to the
provisions of The Royal Proclamation, 1763,3 an imperial instrument
protecting Indian lands, and went on to say:
The territory in dispute has been in Indian occupation from the date of the proclamation
until 1873 [when it was ceded by the native inhabitants to the Crown].... Their possession,
such as it was, can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal
proclamation in favour of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty and
protection of the British Crown. It was suggested in the course of the argument for the
Dominion, that inasmuch as the proclamation recites that the territories thereby reserved
for Indians had never "been ceded to or purchased by" the Crown, the entire property of
the land remained with them. That inference is, however, at variance with the terms of
the instrument, which shew that the tenure of the Indians was a personal and
usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign.4
Lord Watson seemed to think that whatever land rights the Aboriginal
people possessed were ascribable to the bounty of the Crown, as
manifested in the Royal Proclamation, 1763. Even then, these rights
were held at the "good will of the Sovereign." The contrast with
Mackay's outlook is striking.
In recent years, the Privy Council's views on aboriginal land
rights have fallen into partial disrepute, due to an important series of
1 Quoted in Calderv. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 319 [hereinafter Calder].
2 (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherine's Milling].
3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1 [hereinafter Royal Proclamation, 1763]. An
accurate copy of the original printed text is found in C.S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations
Relating toAmerica (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911) at 212-18.
4 St Catherine's Milling, supra note 2 at 54.
[VOL. 34 NO. I
The Organic Constitution
Supreme Court decisions.5 Nevertheless, some of the basic assumptions
that underlie Lord Watson's remarks are still surprisingly influential.
The Canadian legal system has been slow to come to terms with the
perspective implicit in David Mackay's speech: we, the First Peoples of
Canada, are autonomous peoples, with our own laws and lands, our own
systems of government and justice. We are the original custodians of
this land that we now share with you. You are the newcomers. We are
not beholden to you for our basic rights and status.
One reason why the courts have had difficulty in accommodating
this viewpoint is their attachment to a conception of the Constitution
deeply rooted in Canada's colonial past-what may be called the
Imperial Model of the Constitution. In its classic form, the Imperial
Model involves a number of basic tenets, which interconnect and
reinforce one another. As we will see, these tenets have never won
complete acceptance in the courts and in recent times have fallen
increasingly under a cloud. Nevertheless, in one form or another, the
Imperial Model has had a remarkable influence on the thinking of
lawyers and judges over the past century and a half. And, in the absence
of anything better to replace it, it continues to provide the tacit matrix
for much legal thinking about the Constitution. In this paper, I will
examine the basic precepts of the Imperial Model and then propose an
alternative to it, following some guideposts laid down in the recent
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
II. THE IMPERIAL MODEL
There are six basic canons that together make up the Imperial
Model. The first holds that when Europeans began settling in North
America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the native
inhabitants of the continent had no legal status or rights under the
international law of the times. On this view, Aboriginal nations did not
qualify as international entities because of such factors as their modest
size, mobile lifestyle, diffuse political structures, and differing religious
beliefs. Moreover, these groups did not have any international rights to
5 See especially Calder, supra note 1; Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [hereinafter
Guerin]; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025; and R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter
Sparrow]. However, the Privy Council's influence can still be seen, for example, in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafterDelgamuukw]. This decision
was partially reversed on appeal: see (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 (B.C.C.A.); it is now on further
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
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the territories they occupied, which as a matter of law were vacant and
open to appropriation by others.6
On this view, then, the incoming French and British were able to
gain sovereignty over large expanses of North America simply by
"discovering" and exploring them, performing symbolic acts of
appropriation, or founding small settlements along the sea coasts and
riverbanks. In this relatively effortless fashion, France is thought to have
gained an enormous American empire which, as depicted in standard
historical atlases, stretched from the Gulf of the St. Lawrence River
through the Great Lakes as far west as the Prairies and as far south as
the mouth of the Mississippi River. For its part, Great Britain obtained
original title to extensive regions along the Atlantic coast and around
Hudson Bay and later augmented its American empire by conquest and
cession from France in 1713 and 1763.7 So, according to this approach,
Canada's international title to its current territories is grounded in
British title, which in turn partly derives from that of France. In no case
does Canada's title stem from the original title held by indigenous
peoples, for they had no international legal rights to their territories in
the first place.
So, according to the Imperial Model, the factual process by
which Aboriginal peoples joined the Canadian federation does not affect
the legal account of how Canada came to be. Whether that process was
coercive or consensual, whether it proceeded unilaterally or by
agreement, whether it occured in the seventeenth century or only in the
twentieth century, the genesis of Canada remains the same in the eyes of
the law. The only recognized actors in the drama are European states
and their colonial progeny, and so the plot centres on their comings and
goings. When Aboriginal peoples appear on the stage, they are mere
bitplayers and stand-ins.
This account of our legal evolution is rounded out by a
complementary understanding of the Canadian Constitution. According
to the second tenet of the Imperial Model, our basic constitutional
framework finds its roots in British law. The Constitution consists
primarily of statutes passed by the Imperial Parliament, as supplemented
6 For a striking expression of this viewpoint, see R. v. Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 at 313 (N.S.
Co. Ct.) [hereinafter Syliboy]. The Supreme Court of Canada expressed its disapproval of this
passage in Simon v.R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 399.
7 See, for example, the maps in D.G.G. Kerr, Historical Atlas of Canada, 3d rev. ed. (Don
Mills, Ont.: Nelson & Sons, 1975) at 22-23 and 30-31; and H.C. Darby & H. Fu~lard, eds., The New
Cambridge Modem History Atlas, vol. XIV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) at 196-
98.
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by unwritten principles of British constitutional law. These statutes
include the Constitution Act, 18678 and its successors, which established
the basic federal structure of Canada, and, more recently, the
Constitution Act, 19829 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,10 which, although drafted in Canada, were enacted by the
British Parliament at Canada's request. Since 1982, Canada has been
able to amend its Constitution without having to resort to Westminster.
However, according to the Imperial Model, our newfound capacity to
pass amendments locally does not alter the fact that the Canadian
Constitution is rooted historically in British law and still largely
embodied in statutes enacted by the British Parliament.
The third tenet of the Imperial Model extends this point one
stage further. It holds that all governmental authority in Canada
emanates notionally from the Canadian Crown, which acts as the
successor of the British Imperial Crown. This authority is exercised in
the Crown's name by the federal and provincial governments and by
subordinate bodies holding delegated powers. Taken together, these
bodies completely exhaust the field of governmental power in Canada.
So, Aboriginal peoples do not have any inherent jurisdiction over their
lands or peoples. Whatever governmental authority they possess stems
from the Crown by way of delegation. According to the Imperial Model,
in pre-European times indigenous peoples had little that could be
described as true "jurisdiction." However, even supposing that they
originally held such jurisdiction, this ended when the Crown gained
sovereignty over them.
Under the fourth tenet of the Imperial Model, the main body of
our ordinary law also traces its origins to European sources. In Quebec,
private matters are regulated by the Code civil,11 which, as originally
enacted in 1866, codified the laws of Lower Canada (based on the
Coutume de Paris) on the pattern of the Napoleonic Code civil.12 In the
other provinces and territories, the private law is based on English
common law, as imported by settlers or adopted by statute. The laws of
indigenous Canadian peoples have no recognized status in Canada. Any
8 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North America Act, 1867), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867].
9 Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
1 0 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, ibid. [hereinafter Charted.
11 Code civil du Qu6bec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64.
1 2 See the historical account in J.E.C. Brierley & R.A. Macdonald, eds., Quebec Civil Law: An
Introduction to Quebec Private Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at 5-32.
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native custom that existed in pre-contact days was too uncertain and
flexible to merit the name "law."113 In any event, it was automatically
superseded when French and English laws were introduced. As a result,
aboriginal custom cannot be applied by our courts except where adopted
by statute.
We now come to the fifth tenet of the Imperial Model, which
deals with the question of land rights. It holds that Aboriginal peoples
do not have any legal rights to their traditional lands, except where these
rights have been recognized by a Crown act. 14 All land rights in Canada
are deemed to stem from the Crown, either directly or indirectly. There
is no such thing as "aboriginal title" in Canadian law, in the sense of land
rights that spring from longtime use and occupation under customary
law. If any such rights had existed prior to European contact, they came
to an end when the French and British Crowns gained sovereignty and
imposed their own land systems. Whatever land rights indigenous
peoples possess in modem times are necessarily based on Crown acts or
statutory provisions.
The sixth and final tenet of the Imperial Model holds that the
historical agreements concluded by Aboriginal peoples with the French
and British Crowns cannot be characterized as international treaties
because, as already seen, Aboriginal peoples were never recognized as
sovereign entities in international law.1 5 Moreover, these agreements
are not recognized in domestic Canadian law, whether as constitutional
instruments or simple contracts. Whatever legal force they have stems
from statutory provisions, such as section 88 of the Indian Act.
16
Considered globally, the Imperial Model has three main
characteristics. First, it takes an unreservedly Eurocentric view of our
laws and institutions, tracing them to sources in Great Britain or France.
Second, it portrays governmental authority as stemming ultimately from
a single source, the Crown. Third, it subscribes to the positivist creed
that law and governmental institutions are the product of legislation,
grounded ultimately in the sovereign's power to command obedience. In
short, the Imperial Model portrays the Constitution as (1) alien in origin;
(2) monistic in structure; and (3) positive in nature.
1 3 See, for example, the remarks of McEachern CJ. in Delgamuukw, supra note 5 at 447.
14 This was the holding of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Calder v. British Columbia
(A.G.) (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64. The correctness of this holding was thrown in doubt by the
Supreme Court of Canada on further appeal, supra note 1, and was finally laid to rest by the
Supreme Court in Guerin, supra note 5.
1 5 See, for example, Syliboy, supra note 6.
16 pS.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
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Two basic premises underlie and inform the Imperial Model.
The first holds that the indigenous peoples of Canada originally lacked
any international status, territorial title, jurisdiction, laws, or land rights.
We may call this the doctrine of a legal vacuum, because it supposes that
North America was juridically "empty" when Europeans arrived. The
second principle maintains that, even if Aboriginal nations had originally
possessed certain laws and rights prior to contact, they automatically lost
them when European powers gained control, in the absence of explicit
recognition or confirmation. This may be described as the doctrine of
radical discontinuity, because it posits a complete legal rupture between
the periods before and after the Crown's arrival. 17
When reduced to its basic elements, the Imperial Model strikes
me as wrong in principle and profoundly out of harmony with our history
and traditions. Canada is not, after all, the poor, hobbled creature of
eighteenth and nineteenth century British expansionist designs, as the
Imperial Model seems to assume. To the contrary, Canada is an
independent, multinational federation, with an autonomous
Constitution rooted in several centuries of shared and divergent national
experiences. The task before us is to reform our basic understanding of
the Constitution so as to allow these rich bodies of experience to be
tapped. We have to move from a framework grounded in imperial
history to a framework more open to local history, tradition, and
perspectives.
In reality, this process has been underway for more than two
decades. The turning point was the split decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Calder case,18 decided in 1973. While the judges
disagreed on the result, a clear majority recognized the existence of
aboriginal land rights as a matter of Canadian common law. However,
the strongest impetus for change came only in 1982, when Canada
formally patriated its Constitution. The new constitutional package
contained several provisions dealing specifically with the rights of
Aboriginal peoples. The most important of these provisions is section
35(1), which states:
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed.19
17 For more detailed discussion of these doctrines, see B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien
Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law
Centre, 1983).
18 Supra note 1.
19 Constitution Ac4 1982, supra note 9.
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The section goes on to explain that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada
include the Indian, Inuit, and M6tis peoples, and that the rights in
question are guaranteed equally to men and women.
Section 35 represents a basic shift in our understanding of the
constitutional foundations of Canada. As the Supreme Court held in the
leading case of Sparrow, decided in 1990:
[Tihe context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a codification of the
case law on aboriginal rights that had accumulated by 1982. Section 35 calls for a just
settlement for aboriginal peoples. It renounces the old rules of the game under which the
Crown established courts of law and denied those courts the authority to question
sovereign claims made by the Crown.2 0
This decision opens the window, then, to a new conception of the
Constitution, one that places less emphasis on imperial claims and
pronouncements. This new approach may be called the Organic Model,
because it emphasizes that the Constitution is the product of slow and
continuing growth, as molded in part by local Canadian influences and
traditions.21
III. THE ORGANIC MODEL
This new Model takes issue with the six basic canons of the
Imperial Model. First and most fundamentally, the Organic Model
maintains that the French and British Crowns did not acquire title to
North America by virtue of "discovery" and "occupation," as though the
continent were a desert island. North America was not legally vacant at
the time Europeans arrived. It was the domain of a large variety of
independent nations and peoples, which were the custodians of the
territories they controlled. In most cases, Aboriginal nations were never
conquered militarily. In the early years, they frequently entered into
alliances and trading partnerships with incoming European states. As
Aboriginal-European contacts became more extensive and important,
and as the balance of power gradually tilted to the European side, there
was a slow process of accommodation whereby Aboriginal peoples were
constrained to accept piecemeal the suzerainty of the Crown in return
20 Supra note 5 at 406, quoting N. Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation" (1988)
26 Osgoode Hall LU. 95 at 100.
21 For fuller treatment of various aspects of the Organic Model, see my papers: "The
Independence of Canada" (1983) 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 369; "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987)
66 Can. Bar Rev. 727; "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J.
681; and "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261.
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for its protection. In some instances, this arrangement was the fruit of
understandings reached in treaty sessions; in others, it was the result of
informal processes whereby the Crown's suzerainty was gradually
extended and acquiesced in; more rarely, it was the product of war or
overt coercion. The important point is that Aboriginal nations were
active participants in the lengthy processes that eventually gave rise to
the federation of Canada.
So, Canada's modem links with its territories are in part the fruit
of historical relationships with Aboriginal peoples, who were the original
stewards of the land, and whose long-standing presence here dwarfs the
relatively brief span of European settlement. In other words, Canada's
international title is grounded to some extent in the ancient occupation
of indigenous nations. Canada represents, at some level, a merging of
the sovereignties of its various component nations, with Aboriginal
peoples retaining a measure of their original autonomy.
Second, under the Organic Model, our basic constitutional law is
not limited to such enactments as the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982.
These enactments depend for their legitimacy on a more fundamental
body of law, which may be called the common law of the Constitution.
This law has undergone a long period of gestation and has drawn
nourishment from a variety of sources, including local practices and
traditions. Among other things, the common law of the Constitution
provides the framework linking Aboriginal peoples with the
governmental institutions recognized in the statutory portions of the
Constitution.
More specifically, the constitutional law relating to Aboriginal
peoples is grounded in ancient practices generated by interaction
between Aboriginal nations and British and French officials in eastern
North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the
close of the Seven Years' War, when France withdrew in favour of Great
Britain, these practices had crystallized into a distinctive body of
"common" or unwritten law. This body of law was neither European nor
Aboriginal in origin or substance, but drew elements from both sides to
produce a unique set of intersocietal rules, known in modern times as the
doctrine of aboriginal rights. This common law was partially manifested
in such instruments as the Royal Proclamation, 1763,22 which reassured
Aboriginal peoples of their land rights. But the Proclamation was not
the source of the law in question; it only reflected and gave voice to a
much larger body of intersocietal custom.
2 2 Supra note 3.
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The common law doctrine of aboriginal rights has many facets,
which the courts are still in the process of articulating. However, its
main effect, I suggest, is to recognize the internal autonomy, customary
laws, and land rights of Aboriginal peoples, within a federal
superstructure linking them with the broader Canadian community.
The Organic Model supports a third premise. Generally
speaking, Aboriginal peoples emerged from their dealings with the
Crown as partially autonomous entities living under the Crown's
protection, with the right to govern their internal affairs. Over the years,
this common law status was whittled away by statute, and was often
ignored by governmental officials and forgotten by the general public.
However, it remains the essential historical background against which
the modern position of Aboriginal peoples must be understood. Under
the Organic Model, it is also a central element in the panoply of
aboriginal rights recognized in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
According to this view, the aboriginal right of self-government
does not flow from the Crown and does not depend on governmental
grant or recognition. It is an inherent right. However, the right of self-
government is not unlimited in scope and it does not support a claim to
independence. It operates under the aegis of the Canadian
Constitution, and confers powers consistent with the needs and
circumstances of Aboriginal peoples and their historical links with the
larger community.
According to a fourth premise, our laws in private matters are
not restricted to those emanating from England and France; they
include aboriginal laws, as applied within native communities. These
laws are not static, forever preserved in their original state like flies in
amber; they are living things, which evolve over time and adapt to new
needs and circumstances.
Fifth, under Canadian common law, Indian, Inuit, and M6tis
peoples hold aboriginal rights to their traditional lands, except where
these rights have been lawfully qualified by statute or agreement. These
land rights are not based on Crown grant or statutory recognition; they
arise from long-standing occupation under customary law. Aboriginal
title confers communal rights of use and possession and constitutes a
form of collective title, which cannot be alienated by private sale but may
only be surrendered or shared by way of agreement with the Crown.
Aboriginal title is not confined to so-called "traditional" uses, practised
at the time of European contact. It allows indigenous peoples to adapt
their lands to whatever purposes serve their current needs, and permits a
broad range of modern uses, including agriculture, forestry, mining, and
tourism.
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Finally, the Organic Model holds that early treaties concluded
between Aboriginal nations and European powers were often
international in nature, in the sense that they were concluded between
independent, self-governing political entities, each with their own
territories. However, as the balance of power gradually shifted, treaties
increasingly reflected the predominance of the European partner and
embodied the latter's claims of suzerainty. These later treaties operated
increasingly at the domestic level, contributing to the formation of the
Canadian Constitution and the common law doctrine of aboriginal
rights. However, it would be wrong to think that the international and
domestic spheres can be neatly severed. Under the Organic Model, an
historic international treaty between Aboriginal and European entities
might today carry certain domestic effects, and a domestic treaty might
have modern international consequences. What is clear, for our
purposes, is that aboriginal treaties not only contributed in a general way
to the evolution of the Constitution, but also supplied part of its federal
structure. This situation, sometimes described as "treaty federalism,"
has now been formally recognized and consolidated in section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
The Organic Model, then, has three main features, which
contrast with those of the Imperial Model. First, the Organic Model
holds that the Constitution is rooted ultimately in Canadian soil rather
than in Europe, while acknowledging the important influences of Great
Britain and France. Second, the Model subscribes to a pluralist
conception of the sources of law and authority, viewing the Crown as the
constitutional trustee of coordinate spheres of jurisdiction rather than
their exclusive source. Third, the Model rejects the positivist view that
our most fundamental laws are embodied in legislation and are
grounded ultimately on the sovereign's power to command obedience;
rather, it portrays the law as immanent in our collective practices and
traditions, which, in turn, reflect more basic values and principles. In
summary, the Organic Model views the Constitution as (1) indigenous to
Canada, rather than an alien import; (2) complex in structure, rather
than monistic; and (3) fundamentally customary in nature, rather, than
composed simply of positive law.
Two basic principles lie at the foundations of the Organic Model.
The first rejects the view that North America was a legal vacuum at the
time of European contact. It holds that America was the domain of a
variety of aboriginal polities, possessing international status, territorial
title, jurisdiction, laws, and land rights, with the capacity to enter into
international treaties and other relations. This view forms the core of
what we have called the doctrine of aboriginal rights. The second
1995]
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principle denies that aboriginal laws, jurisdiction, and land rights were
automatically terminated when European powers gained sovereignty. It
maintains that these rights presumptively remained in force under the
new regime, as necessarily modified by the advent of the Crown. We
may call this the doctrine of continuity.23
Thus, the Organic Model encourages us to broaden our
conception of the sources of Canadian law and to recognize the diverse
roles that Indian, Inuit, and M6tis peoples have played in the formation
of this country and its Constitution. It suggests that Aboriginal peoples
should be viewed as active participants in generating the basic norms
that govern us-not as people on the fringes, helpless victims, or
recipients of constitutional handouts from the government or the courts,
but as contributors to the evolution of our Constitution and most
fundamental laws. In short, aboriginal conceptions of law and rights
really count-not as curiosities of another time and place or as the
denizens of exotic legal pigeonholes, but as a fundamental part of our
living legal traditions.
More generally, the Organic Model opens up the Constitution to
a variety of perspectives that have long been excluded or assigned to the
periphery of our collective life. The Model represents a further stage in
the long process of decolonization that Canada has undergone since
1867. If we have been slow to free ourselves from the trammels of
imperial rule, preferring to accomplish by gradual processes of evolution
what others have effected abruptly by force of arms, we have been even
slower to embark on the task of internal decolonization. It is only a
Canadian, perhaps, who would prefer the silent shifting of constitutional
paradigms in the night to the tumultuous drama of a Boston Tea Party
or a Bastille. Nevertheless, as an astute observer of the Commonwealth
once said: "There is much to be said for stealth and subtlety as methods
of revolution, if revolution there must be."24
23 See Slattery, supra note 17.
24 R.T.E. Latham, The Law and the Commonwealth (London: Oxford University Press, 1949)
at 534.
[voL. 34 NO. 1
